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MUST SPEECH BE SPECIAL?
Frederick Schauer*

Academic and judicial thinking about freedom of speech seems to
have entered a new phase, one that might be called the "reemergence
of theory." We are now experiencing an attention to the underlying
premises of the principle of freedom of speech that is both more conscious and more sustained than at any time in the past. In order to
explain this development, it is necessary to take a brief look at the
phases that have preceded the current one. Obviously these phases
overlap, and my characterizations represent rough generalizations
rather than inviolate truths. Indeed, any such characterization is little
more than the identification of one interesting feature from among a
morass of interconnected similarities and differences. Thus, like most
attempts to put the phenomena of the world into large generalizations,
drawing these distinctions says much more about the draftsman than
about the world. I plead guilty to the charge, but the contrasts seem
nevertheless worthy of exploration.
From 1919 until about twenty years ago, discussion about freedom
of speech in the context of the first amendment took place largely in the
"How much?" mode. The courts and first amendment theorists commonly acknowledged, as Holmes put it, that the first amendment was
not "intended to give immunity for every possible use of language." 1
Thus, the various exceptions to the coverage2 of the first amendment* Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Visiting Professor of Law (19831984), University of Michigan. A.B., M.B.A., Dartmouth College; J.D., Harvard University. Although this Article deals with a theme similar to that of the Review Essay by Professors Alexander
and Horton that appears in this issue, Alexander & Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech
Principle, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1319 (1983), I had not seen their review when this Article was written.
I plan to respond to Professors Alexander and Horton at some later date.
I Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
2 I use the word "coverage" to refer to those activities the regulation of which is to be measured against the standards of the first amendment. It is quite possible that certain conduct, even
when measured against the standards of the first amendment, will remain unprotected. Yet the
distinction between coverage and protection is designed to point out that there is a big difference
between those activities (some of which are verbal) that have nothing to do with the first amendment, and those that at least require that governmental action be tested against relatively stringent
first amendment standards. I have dealt with this distinction at great length elsewhere. F.
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92, 134-35 (1982); Schauer, Can Rights
Be Abused?, 31 PHIL. Q. 225 (1981); Schauer, "Private" Speech and the 'Private" Forum: Givhan v.
Western Line School District, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 217, 227-29 [hereinafter cited as Schauer, Private
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commercial advertising, 3 defamation,4 obscenity, 5 and fighting
words6-were rarely called into serious question. Moreover, even with
respect to political and other speech that the first amendment plainly
covered, the battle lines were narrowly drawn. No one doubted that
free speech was a good thing, at least in the abstract, and consequently
there was little concern for why free speech was valued. Instead the
problems centered around the weight to be given freedom of speech
when it conflicted with other universally acknowledged values, most
commonly national security and public order.7 Although in retrospect
it seems that this debate could have been illuminated by closer attention to the philosophical foundations of the principles of free speech,
that was not the course taken. Rather, the tired metaphors of the marketplace of ideas and the search for truth served as stage props for a
debate over how much the values of free speech would have to yield in
the face of exigent public concerns. 8
This is not to say that the issues present in this phase were easy.
On the contrary, the judicial and academic divisions during this period
of growth of free speech doctrine-roughly from 1919 to the mid1960's-were as sharp as they have ever been.9 But the combatants
Speech]; Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv.
265, 267-82 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Schauer, Categories].
3 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
4 Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
S Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
6 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
7 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941).
8 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
9 Many of these debates took place between the so-called "absolutists" and the so-called
"balancers." E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Mendelsohn, On the Meaning ofthe First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821
(1962); Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Se!f-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L.
REv. 4 (1961).
I suppose that characterizing an enormously complex range of issues in terms of a simple
dichotomy between balancing and absolutism served a purpose in its time, but it has had the
unfortunate consequence of continuing to channel debate about important first amendment issues
into a preconceived mold of balancing versus absolutism, even among those who ought to know
better. E.g., Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and
Manner Regulations, 18 Nw. U. L. REV. 937 (1983); Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic
Regulation: Away From a General Theory ofthe First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1212 (1983).
For example, the simple designation of "balancing" masks questions about who should weigh
competing values, the extent to which balancing should take place in more or less rigid rules or in
the circumstances of the individual case (and that is a continuum and not a dichotomy), and the
level of abstraction at which the competing values should be described and weighed. Similarly,
absolutism may be taken to entail a narrowly circumscribed first amendment within which direct
restrictions are prohibited, or it may be taken instead as a desire to formulate specific first amendment rules of adjudication that grant little if any power to the judge in the individual case to
examine the state's particular reasons for restricting in that case, or to examine the extent to which
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seemed relatively unconcerned with the deeper meaning of free speech.
First amendment partisans took it as a given that maximum protection
of free speech was a good thing, 10 and devoted their efforts to arguing
that the perceived dangers of speech were not nearly as great as was
often assumed. And those who were wary of excess protection of
speech were similarly unconcerned with the deep theory of the first
amendment. They saw no reason to doubt the value of free speech in
the abstract, but were unwilling in real cases to sacrifice many of their
fears about dangers to security, order, and the stability of the state. 11
The 1960's and 1970's brought a new phase to free speech theory, a
phase that substituted for the question "How much?" the seemingly
simpler question of "How?" This was, of course, a period of intense
solicitude for individual rights, and free speech was no exception.
There was no call to examine the reasons for accepting the principle of
free speech, for everyone agreed without question that maximum freedom of speech (and most other things as well) was desirable. As a
result, most disputes focused on the strategies for achieving maximum
protection. 12 This search for how to attain optimal free speech protection pervaded not only the academic commentary, but the work of the
courts as well. For it was during this phase that those studying the first
amendment witnessed the judicial creation of the various devices that
have now become acknowledged weapons in the first amendment arsenal-vagueness, 13 overbreadth, 14 the chilling effect, 15 special procea particular speaker or speech is important in light of the principles of freedom of speech. This
latter version of absolutism, focusing on restricting judicial power, is implicit in Baker's argument,
and is quite different from the former version, which partially characterizes Meiklejohn's special
concern with restricting legislative power.
That an absolutist-balancer dichotomy obscures important problems and variations is only
part of the problem. Equally troublesome is the extent to which language from a former and
largely different war is used to describe the battles of today. The language has acquired so much
baggage from its previous usage that it blocks us from appreciating the ways in which today is
different from yesterday. q. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897)
(deploring the confusion caused when terms with ethical associations are used in legal discourse).
10 Indeed, for some the refusal to consider first principles was part of a belief that the first
amendment itself had already resolved the question. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366
U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
11 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 561 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of
Thuggery in War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REv. 539 (1920). The tendency to accentuate
dangers is somewhat related to another problem, that of being most willing to support freedom of
speech as long as it takes place Somewhere Else. This view is not surprising, for in most of the
interesting free speech disputes of recent times the litigants have been quite unpleasant people
carrying equally unpleasant messages. See Schauer, Cod!fYing the First Amendment: New York v.
Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 286-87, 315-16.
12 E.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Kalven, "Uninhibited,
Robust, and Wide-Open"-A Note on Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 289
(1968); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel
and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968).
13 E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
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dural protection, 16 and many others. With free speech once again
taken as a given in this search for methods of protecting it, there was, as
in the previous phase, little occasion for concentrated attention on the
''Why?" rather than the "How?" or the "How much?" of the first
amendment.
From the foregoing two phases, a first amendment emerged that
was, at its core, quite strong. Although perhaps it was not strong
enough to satisfy those who exalt free speech above all other values,
there is little doubt that Brandenburg v. Ohio, 11 New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,1 8 and Cohen v. Cal!fornia 19 represent a profound commitment
to virtually unlimited discussion of political, moral, and social questions of all types. 20 Moreover, this strong core was well guarded by a
host of procedural and subsidiary doctrines that seem to make it relatively safe from erosion.
From this secure core, arguments in the current phase of free
speech theory have centered around the broadening of the first amendment. The most prominent example of the broadening of the first
amendment is of course commercial advertising, 21 but the same phenomenon exists with respect to campaign contributions,22 speech by
public employees during working hours,23 nude dancing,24 and the
choice by government of the books or entertainment that it will offer in
(1967). The vagueness doctrine, of course, is of rather more ancient lineage, e.g., Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), thus making it an especially available tool somewhat later.
14 E.g., Zwickler v. Keota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Flowers, 377 U.S.
288 (1964).
15 E.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965).
16 E.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) (burden of proof); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (burden of proof; promptness; availability of appeal); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (burden of proof).
17 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). Brandenburg's strength is best appreciated if assessed in
light of Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
18 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
19 403 u.s. 15 (1971).
20 The clearest indicator of the strength of the core of the first amendment today is the ease
with which the Supreme Court has overturned content-based restrictions of speech that are related
to public issues. E.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Consolidated
Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). Indeed, the importance of discussion of "matters of public concern" is
underscored by the Court's recent protection of the right to discuss those matters by an employe~;
on a government employer's premises and time. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
21 Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). On
what counts as commercial speech, see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875
(1983).
22 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
23 Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). See also Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
24 Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922
(1975).
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its facilities. 25 In each of these areas, recent developments have made
first amendment considerations applicable to issues that in the recent
past were considered well without the boundaries of the first amendment. Moreover, for every instance of judicial broadening of the first
amendment, there seem to be at least ten attempts in the academic literature to have the first amendment swallow up one more segment of
society or of governmental action. 26
With this process of broadening, or at least arguing about broadening, has come the reemergence of theory. For although the accepted
assumptions, traditional metaphors, and standard platitudes about the
value of free speech might have been largely sufficient to deal with the
issues of the past, they are clearly inadequate to confront the questions
we must ask when trying to determine the extent to which, if at all, the
courts should broaden the coverage of the first amendment to encompass a wide range of activities seemingly so far from the comprehension
of the classical free speech theorists that the relevance of classical theory has become attenuated. In the place of the classical theories have
come new attempts to ask about the "Why?" of the first amendment, in
the hope of developing a theory that will explain the values that the
concept of free speech is designed to serve. With such a theory in
place, of course, it becomes much easier to confront the questions
raised by the broadening of the first amendment. For if we know why
we have the principles of free speech, then we can determine in the new
case whether that class of activities is the type that the first amendment
is designed to promote.
Would that it be so easy! The problem, of course, is that there are
numerous candidates for the appropriate underlying theory of the free
speech and free press clauses of the first amendment. Indeed, the concentration in this Symposium on deep theory, either explicitly or implicitly, is strong evidence of the way that debate about freedom of
speech has shifted. In order to shed some light on the debate about the
philosophical/sociological/political/historical foundations of free
speech, it seems appropriate to set some ground rules, or at least some
standards that an adequate theory must satisfy. Surprisingly, hardly
any attention has been devoted to this task. 27 On second thought, it
probably is not so surprising. Almost everyone would prefer being the
star quarterback to being the referee or a member of the rules commit25 Board ofEduc., Island Trees Free Union School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality
opinion); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
26 E.g., Kamenshine, 17ze First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF.
L. Rev. 1104 (1979); Morgan, 17ze Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
297 (1982). See also the fascinating analysis of sleeping as speech in Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
27 The most notable exception is Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw. U.L.
Rev. 237 (1978).
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tee. Yet if there were no rules, and no referees, there would be no star
quarterbacks, so someone has to do the job, and that is part of what I
want to accomplish here. But it is also too large a task to complete in
this forum, so I want to concentrate on only part of it. I want to deal
with the question of whether, and if so to what extent, an adequate
theory of free speech must explain the way in which the activities encompassed by the first amendment are importantly distinct from activities that do not receive such uniquely cherished protection. In other
words, must speech be special?
I
In asking whether speech is or must be special, we must start by
clarifying the nature of the question. That is, no one could plausibly
claim that the activities covered by the first amendment share no characteristics whatsoever with activities not covered by the first amendment. Rather, the claim I want to consider is more modest. Do the
activities covered by the first amendment28 possess at least one and
maybe more theoretically relevant differences from those activities not
so covered? If they do, then we can say that the activities covered by
the first amendment are in some sense special. But if they do not-if
they are an analytically indistinguishable subset of a larger category,
not all of which is protected by the first amendment-then we can say
that speech is not special.
The question of whether speech is special has a descriptive side
and a normative side. On the descriptive side, the question is whether
one can identify relevant differences between speech and activities not
covered by the first amendment. But on the normative side, the question is whether such a difference is necessary for a satisfactory underlying theory of the first amendment. For it is by no means inconceivable,
and indeed may very well be the case, that what is analytically necessary for a satisfactory theory of the first amendment is unattainable
given the existing state of the world. Yet that is getting ahead of things.
For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the question "Must speech
be special?" is analytically distinct from the question "Is speech
special?".
In dealing with these issues, I want to discuss one particular strand
of free speech theory that presents the problems most starkly. This
strand I will call the "self-development" theory, and I use that designation precisely because it is different from the titles of the various theories that I believe comprise it. I mean to include within the category
28 Whether the "activities covered by the first amendment" are all "speech" in a non-technical
sense is a crucially important question, but not germane to the instant discussion. The reader may
assume that "activities covered by the first amendment" and "speech" in a technical sense are here
used synonymously. See Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity'~· An Exercise
in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 61 GEo. L.J. 899 (1979).
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those theories relying variously on self-realization,29 self-fulfillment,30
self-expression,3 1 and variants on the individual liberty core of all of
these theories. Conversely, I mean to exclude from the category the
leading consequentialist justifications for a principle of freedom of
speech, including most prominently th~ search for truth/marketplace
of ideas theories, 32 the popular sovereigntyI democratic process theories, 33 and the distrust of government theories. 34
There are important differences among the various theories that
are components of the self-development strand of first amendment theory, and I do not want to suggest that they are little more than minor
variations of each other. For present purposes, however, they do share
significant similarities. One is that they are all based on the value to
the individual of a regime in which free speech flourishes, and that this
value to the individual is taken as an end in itself. These theories,
therefore, although perhaps consequentialist with respect to the individual, are not premised on the value to society of permitting free
speech. Rather the focus is on what free speech can do for the individual, either as speaker, 35 or as listener,36 or both.
But the most striking feature of all of these self-development theories is that they identify as the value underlying the principle of freedom of speech a value that is not peculiar to speech. In every variant at
issue the value that self-development theorists urge is a value that can
undoubtedly be promoted by speech. Nevertheless, that same value can
also be promoted by other activities that do not involve communication, and self-development theorists offer no particular reason why
29 E.g., Redish, The Value o/Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Redish, Free Speech]; Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value o/ Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982); Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom o/ Expression: A Reply to Proftssor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982).
30 E.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 12, at 6-7; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57879 (1978).
31 For a fuller description and critique of this whole range oftheones, see F. ScHAUER, supra
note 2, at 47-67.
32 E.g., J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 268-304
(M. Lerner ed. 1961); J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (J.C. Suffolk ed. 1968). The leading judicial
embodiments are Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
IBEW Local501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34,40 (2d Cir. 1950), qff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951) (L. Hand, J.).
33 E.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948);
BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits o/
Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). See also H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1966); M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
34 E.g., F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 73-86; Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521.
35 E.g., Baker, supra note 29; Baker, Scope o/ the First Amendment Freedom o/ Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978).
36 E.g., Redish, supra note 29.
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communicative activities can serve the goal more completely or more
frequently than other activities that are not in any significant sense
communicative.37
I want to illustrate this point from two different perspectives.
First, we can look at those theories emphasizing in some way or another the self-expressive aspects of communicating.38 Each of these
theories relies on the fact that expressing one's self is an important
component of individual liberty, and if we do not allow channels of
self-expression then we will suffer accordingly. Now this is of course
true, but the question is whether communicating serves any particularly
special function in terms of self-expression.39 I can also express myself
in my attire, my occupation, my sexual activity and preferences, my
residence, my hobbies and other recreations, and so on. The list is virtually endless, and that is exactly the point. Communicating is obviously a form of self-expression, but it is by no means the only form of
self-expression, and it is by no means the form of self-expression that is
most important to everyone. Thus, the argument from self-expression
leads to the conclusion that all forms of self-expression are worthy of
equivalent protection. As a result, it is impossible to distinguish an argument from self-expression as an argument for freedom of speech
from an argument from self-expression as an argument for liberty in
general.
The same conclusion follows if we focus not on the self-expression
of the speaker, but rather on the self-fu1fillment or self-realization of
the speaker or listener-on the ways that speaking or listening to
speech makes one a better, or fuller, or more satisfied, or more perfect
person.40 Again, I have no doubt that speech does indeed serve all of
these functions. Yet once again there seems no reason to believe that
communication serves these functions any better or more often than do
non-communicative activities. For some people, self-realization lies in
their occupation, their travels, their inner contemplation, or their family life. Communication, whether one is speaker or listener, is merely
one of a myriad of activities that in some way promotes self-fu1fillment
or self-realization.
In the form just presented, therefore, the theories under discussion
37 In one sense, of course, all actions are communicative, or at least those actions that are in
one way or another perceived by someone else. But in this sense Pike's Peak, the Empire State
Building, and a 1957 Ford are all communicative, for all can inspire thoughts in a viewer. But
comprehending the notion of free speech will be even more hopeless than it already is unless we
assume a specific intention by a human being to communicate some message to another human
being. Even this may not help very much, but that is probably because of the pervasive difficulty
that I suggest at the very end of this Article.
38 E.g., Baker, supra note 35; Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974).
39 For a fuller elaboration of this point, see F. ScHAUER, supra note 2, at 50-52.
40 E.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 12, at 6-7; Redish, supra note 29.
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provide the ideal vehicle for discussing whether it is necessary for a
satisfactory theory of the first amendment that speech be in some way
special. For under these theories and their variants, speech is not
claimed to be special, or significantly distinguishable from the other
activities that may also contribute to the value that provides the basis of
the theory. If it is necessary to a satisfactory theory of the first amendment that some such distinguishing feature be provided, then all of
these theories must be considered to be failures.
II

The locus classicus of objections to self-development theories is a
paragraph in an article by Robert Bork41 in which Bork scrutinizes the
claimed benefits from speech of "development of individual faculties
and the achievement of pleasure."42 He finds both of these justifications wanting for precisely the reason that I am discussing here:
[T]he important point is that these benefits do not distinguish speech from
any other human activity. An individual may develop his faculties or
derive pleasure from trading on the stock market, following his profession
as a river port pilot, working as a barmaid, engaging in sexual activity,
playing tennis, rigging prices or in any of thousands of other endeavors.
Speech with only the first two benefits can be preferred to other activities
only by ranking forms of personal gratification. These functions or benefits of speech are, therefore, to the principled judge, indistinguishable
from the functions or benefits of all other human activity. He cannot, on
neutral grounds, choose to protect speech that has only these functions
more than he protects any other claimed freedom. 43

This argument draws its significance from the fact that the first
amendment protects speech more than it protects non-speech conduct.44 Without this contrast the first amendment serves no function.
To the extent that the argument from self-development in all of its
41 Bork, supra note 33. Expressing sympathy with part of Bork's article, as I am about to do in
the text, runs a great risk of confusion, owing to the fact that Bork's article contains an enormous
number of highly contested points of constitutional theory. For a taste of the dispute, see, e.g. ,
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981). I find guilt by association quite deplorable in academic discourse, but let me make it clear that I do not mean to be taken as dealing with or
expressing sympathy with any of Bork's theory except the particular point quoted below.
42 Bork, supra note 33, at 25. This is Bork's characterization of the first two of the four values
underlying free speech as set forth by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (Whitney was later overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 449 (1969).
43 Bork, supra note 33, at 25. The references to the "principled judge" and "neutral grounds"
relate to Bork's full theory of constitutional adjudication and are not under discussion here. See
supra note 41.
44 I use "non-speech conduct" to refer to activities not covered by the first amendment. The
contrast between the amount of protection given within the first amendment and that given
outside it is nowhere presented more clearly than in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973).
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forms collapses into an argument for general liberty, then no argument
has been presented for a principle of free speech that is stronger than a
general principle of personal liberty. Because in American constitutional doctrine we protect personal liberty only by application of the
minimal scrutiny of the rational basis standard,45 a justification that
fails to distinguish the activities protected by the stringent standard of
the first amendment from the activities protected by the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test has failed in its task of explaining the
protection of freedom of speech under the first amendment.

III
Now that I have presented the issue, I want to step away from the
Constitution for a moment. Thus, I will first consider the argument
against self-development as a question of social and political philosophy, completely divorced from any questions about American law in
general or the first amendment in particular. This will provide the ap- ·
propriate background for then turning to the argument as a question
under the first amendment. I consider the two questions to be separate,
and therefore consider them separately, because there is a point in having a written, authoritative constitution. Moreover, the authoritative
nature of a written constitution makes it possible that an answer generated by ideal political theory will be unsupportable in the constitutional text, and indeed possibly even inconsistent with it.46 In these
cases, it is the duty of the judge to refrain from doing what is foreclosed
by the text, even if that judge's own view of ideal political theory might
lead to the opposite result. 47
As a question of social and political philosophy, the argument
against the adoption of the self-development principle is premised on a
point about the nature of moral and practical reason. If a specific principle is generated by a broader principle, and if we accept the broader
principle, then we must, at the risk of self-contradiction, accept every
other specific principle also generated by the broader principle, unless
we can give particular and articulated reasons for drawing a distinction.48 If we accept X, and if X generates a, b, and c, then we must be
45 E.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (per curiam); Hollenbaugh v.
Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
46 I am here presupposing a by no means uncontroversial point of constitutional theory, but
this is not the place to present a full theory of constitutional adjudication. For the constitutional
theory that (in part) undergirds the views presented here, see Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional
Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797 (1982).
47 See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981). See also J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
48 For a more extensive discussion, see F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 3-12.
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willing, if we are to act rationally, to accept a, b, and c, and not just the
one or two of those that happen to strike our fancy at the moment.
In the context ofthe principle of freedom of speech, then, ifwe say
that we value free speech because it is a form of self-development, and
if we accept self-development as a given, then, if we have not justified
any qualification, we must be willing to protect every form of self-development as much as we protect speech. Yet many forms of self-development, as I am using that term, can cause harm to other individuals or
to society in general. It would be implausible to suppose that the state
is or could be significantly disabled to prevent harms merely because
the cause of those harms was, in the process, engaged in self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization. Thus we acknowledge that, in
general, the prevention of harm is a proper function of the state, regardless of how nice the causing of harm may make someone feel.
But if speech is merely one category within the larger universe of
self-developing actions, then it would seem, again to be consistent, that
we would have to accept the principle that speech may be restricted
when it causes harm to others. Yet then what is the point of a principle
of free speech? Many communicative acts, including many that our
pre-theoretical understanding of the nature of free speech would lead
us to want to protect, have the capacity for causing significant harm to
others or to society in general. Indeed, if I may return to American
constitutional law for a moment, it is hard to think of any first amendment case in which the communicative acts at issue did not cause some
degree of harm, or at least offense.49 The anguish caused by the Nazis
in Skokie,so the offense and annoyance of Cohen's jacket51 and
Cantwell's phonograph, 52 the damage to Damron's reputation and career, 53 the economic losses of even the innocent merchants of Claiborne
49 Offense now seems to have settled in as a recognized harm under the first amendment. E.g.,
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976). Nevertheless, the question of whether offense should be treated as a cognizable harm
under the first amendment is by no means beyond dispute. Compare Feinberg, Pornography and
the Criminal Law, 40 U. P1rr. L. REv. 567 (1979) with Schauer, Response: Pornography and the
First Amendment, 40 U. PllT. L. REv. 605 (1979).
The very fact that we can still debate about offense in the first amendment context underscores the point in the text, because there is no question that, outside of the first amendment
context, a large variety of actions that are merely offensive can be controlled by government.
Even though some may argue that offense is still far too often used as an improper basis for
governmental regulation, e.g., D. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW (1982), there is
still no question that offensive smells can be regulated, and so too in general can unsightly buildings, etc. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
50 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953, cert. denied, 439 U.S.
916 (1978).
51 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
52 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
53 Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
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County,54 the distortion of the election process by money or misleading
promises,55 and the humiliation caused by publicity about the victim
of a sex offense56 are but a small sample of instances in which the principle of freedom of speech is understood to prevent the government
from intervening to deal with the kinds of harm that are normally
taken to be sufficient to justify use of the state's coercive powers.
Thus, we want to protect speech not because it causes no harm, but
despite the harm it may cause.57 Our search for a justification, therefore, is a search for a reason to distinguish speech from the entire range
of intentional actions. This is exactly the distinction that the various
arguments from self-development fail to provide. As a result, these arguments tell us why we should protect liberty in general, but in the
process they also become arguments for giving speech no greater protection than that given to the full range of other intentional actions. As
a question of social and political theory, therefore, the arguments from
self-development fail to provide a reason for recognizing a principle
that grants greater protection for speech against state intervention than
it grants to anything else the individual might wish to do.

IV
Let us now tum from abstract political theory, and attempt to look
at this question as one arising in the attempt to formulate a theory of
this 58 Constitution's first amendment. In order to do this, we must rely
on the notion of principled adjudication. Unfortunately, however, the
idea of principled adjudication, or of neutral principles,59 has been the
subject of so much redefinition and misinterpretation that I would like
to use an alternative term, confessing in the process that this term
merely reflects an idea already well-established in the literature, 60 if
only one is willing to wade through all the drivel. 61
54

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).

55 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S.

290 (1981).
56 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
57 See Schauer, supra note 49.
58 See Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpfol Contributions ofSpecial Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983).
59 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). See
also Bork, supra note 33. The notion, in some form or another, has made its way into the jargon
of the Supreme Court. E.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481,
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a broadside attack, see Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
60 See Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 35
(1963); Greenawalt, The Enduring Sign!ficance of Neutral Principles, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 982
(1978).
61 Unfortunately, I do not have the nerve to supply references for the characterization made in
the text.
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Thus, I want to refer to the notion of articulate consistency. 62 This
term is designed to emphasize that we are dealing with a question of
consistency and not of the rightness or wrongness of principles, and
that the particular notion at issue is largely controlled by the way that a
court chooses to articulate its reasons for a decision. The constraint of
articulate consistency suggests that when we justify a decision by reference to a principle (or a reason, rule, standard, justification, or theory)
we must be willing to apply the principle, as articulated in the first
decision, to all cases coming within the verbal description of that principle. When a court provides, without qualification, a reason for its
decision, it must be willing to apply that reason in future cases, absent
particularly strong reasons to the contrary. 63 The key feature of articulate consistency is the way in which it is normatively neutral, or procedural. The requirements of articulate consistency can apply to good
reasons, bad reasons, or reasons totally unjustified by the judicial role.
If a court sticks to what it says, if it is willing to take seriously its own
statements, 64 then it has satisfied the requirements of articulate consistency. And this is no less true if the original reasons or justifications
are wrong, outrageous, or whatever.
We can see, therefore, that the court in the first case has a great
deal of control over how much of a constraint the notion of articulate
consistency is going to be. If the court in the first case justifies its decision by a very narrow principle, festooned with caveats, qualifications,
and exceptions, then it is unlikely that the constraint of articulate consistency will be a significant barrier to what the court decides to do in
the next case.65 On the other hand, if the court in the first case justifies
its decision by a broad and generally unqualified principle, then the
62 After imagining that I was the first to use this term, I discovered that it had been used
previously by Ronald Dworkin. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 88 (1977). My use is
quite similar to his, and I have been unable to come up with an acceptable alternative, so I will
forfeit my claim to originality, if not to independent creation.
63 That is, most of the constraints on adjudication, including this one, are presumptive rather
than absolute. Yet the creation of a presumption in place of a clean slate is still a significant
change. On the less than absolute nature of the neutral principles constraint, see Greenawalt,
supra note 60, at 1007-08. q: R. DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 110·15 ("gravitational force" of
precedent).
64 See Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1979). See
also Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 WIS. L. REv.
467; Monaghan, supra note 47, at 387-91; Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It
Always Meant?, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 1029 (1977); Schauer, supra note 46, at 829. For the Supreme
Court's most recent dispute about the weight to be given to its precedents, see the various opinions
in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
65 The difficulty, of course, is that a highly qualified opinion will provide little if any guidance
to lower courts as they attempt to follow the Supreme Court. One wonders at times whether the
Court does not pay too little attention to this "guidance" function. See Corr, Retroactivity: A
Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C.L. REV. 745 (1983); Easterbrook, Ways of
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 807-11 (1982); Schauer, Private Speech, supra note 2,
at 217-18.
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necessity of remaining faithful to this principle will exercise a substantial constraint on future decisions. Thus, the extent to which a principle applies in future cases is controlled by the justification that the
court has provided in the first case.
We can now return to the principle of free speech, for it is the
notion of articulate consistency that provides the link between the
points made in the previous section and the same issue in the context of
constitutional law. If a court says that it is protecting act x under the
first amendment because x is an instance of self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization, and the first amendment protects self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization, then the court must be willing
to apply that same principle in future cases. But since any intentional
action can and usually is an instance of self-expression, self-fulfillment,
or self-realization, then the constraints of articulate consistency would
require the court to protect all intentional actions under the first
amendment. The court, to be consistent, must be willing to apply the
reason given in the first case to subsequent cases fitting within the
description of the principle. If the principle is described merely as selfexpression, then the first amendment must protect all self-expressive
actions. Yet of course it is not true that all self-expressive actions are
protected by the first amendment,66 or even by any other part of the
Constitution.67 Thus, the problem with the entire range of self-development justifications for the first amendment is that they fail the test of
articulate consistency. Without more, they offer a rationale that is far
broader than we are willing to accept, which if consistently applied
would protect almost all activities to the same extent that we protect
certain communicative activities. Because we are unwilling to do this,
these justifications might just as well not have been mentioned at all. A
reason we are not willing to follow is no reason at all.

v
I noted in Section III that there was a point in having written and
authoritative constitutions, or at least that an authoritative constitution
must be taken as such. In order to be faithful to this conviction, I must
deal with the textual response to the arguments I have just presented. 68
Thus, it is freedom of speech and press, and not freedom of liberty in
general, that is specifically set forth in the text for special protection.
Even if the justification would, to be fully consistent, have to be applied
to a far wider range of cases, only part of this range is picked out by the
constitutional text for special attention. The reason we do not apply
the self-development arguments to their full reach is that we lack the
66 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
67 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
68 See especially Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982).
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constitutional mandate for so doing. Because we have that mandate in
the case of speech, we can proceed to apply that justification in speech
cases. The relevant distinction under this argument-what makes
speech special-is the very fact that the constitutional text says it is.
One might call this the argument from coincidence. Even if there
is no good reason for treating speech specially, the text says we must,
and that is sufficient to justify the special protection for speech. And to
the extent that the text is clear, we cannot legitimately avoid it. Thus,
there may be no completely justifiable reason for limiting the presidency to those thirty-five years old or older,69 or for giving equal representation in the Senate to Delaware and California,70 but these are the
mandates from the text, so we follow them. And so too, picking out
speech for special treatment is the mandate from the text, and that's
that. Speech is special by stipulation, even though now the stipulation
may seem a bit odd.
But this loses sight of why we are looking at justifications at all.
The very reason we are concerned about the underlying theoretical justification for the principle of freedom of speech, in a way that we are
not with respect to the age of the presidency and equal representation
in the Senate,7 1 is that the text is not clear, 72 and we are therefore required to work out a theory of free speech so that we can intelligently
apply the vague words of the document. 73 The argument from coincidence is therefore circular. It calls upon us to note the presence of
speech and not action in general in the text, but it is the very unclarity
of the text that is the impetus for the entire enterprise. If we assume we
cannot have a literal interpretation of the first amendment,74 then we
69 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; U.S. CoNST. art. 5.
71 It is incorrect to say that we are not concerned about justifications for, say, the age requirement because the issues do not arise. The very reason they do not arise is that the text is clear. If
article II specified merely that the President had to be of "sufficient maturity", there would be
frequently litigated controversies over that phrase (unless it was deemed a political question), and
consequent great concern with underlying purpose and theory.
72 For many years those sympathetic to a strong first amendment were influenced by the view
of Justice Black that the first amendment was plain and unequivocal. See, e.g., Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (Black, J., dissenting); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155
(1959) (Black, J., concurring); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
Fortunately, we have now been released from the shackles of literalism, and we understand the
way in which the text of the first amendment is importantly vague. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Speech
and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 645, 731; Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review o/the Free
Speech Clause, 10 CALIF. L. REv. 107, 110-28 (1982). See also Schauer, Categories,supra note 2,
at 267-68; Schauer, supra note 28, at 902-05. An intriguing analysis is found in Note, The Speech
and Press Clauses t?fthe First Amendment as Ordinary Language, 81 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1973).
73 Obviously, my reference to ''working out a theory" presupposes an approach that treats the
free speech and other similar constitutional clauses as more or less discrete units of analysis, and,
more importantly, places no great weight on the specific or general intentions of the drafters. See
Schauer, supra note 46.
74 This assumption can take two forms. First, it can be a conclusion from the vague and
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must interpret it in light of some underlying purpose or theory. But if
that underlying theory says nothing in particular about speech, if it
does not set speech apart from a vast range of other conduct, then there
is no principled stopping point after we leave the domain of what is
very specifically and unequivocally mentioned in the text. To put it
bluntly, the argument from coincidence might support applying the
first amendment to all self-expressive or self-fulfilling instances of
speech (taken literally) or press (taken literally), but the argument is of
no assistance if we are trying to figure out why or how to apply the first
amendment to oil paintings and handwritten manuscripts but not to
nude bathing or riding a motorcycle without a safety helmet.75
VI

I now want to consider an alternative response to the argument
equivocal language of the text. See supra note 72. See also J. ELY, supra note 47, at 105; Mendelson, supra note 9, at 821. On the other hand, it can also flow from what Professor Van Alstyne
calls the "irresistable counterexample." Van Alstyne, supra note 72, at 113. Even if the language
were both literal and absolute, which it clearly is not, it is inconceivable that certain "speech"
activities, whether perjury, price-fixing, extortion, ordinary solicitation to ordinary crimes, face-toface fraud, or the making of representations about securities, could be considered exempt from
governmental regulation. This latter approach can be characterized as "The Constitution does not
mean what it says." The former can be characterized as ''The Constitution means what it says,
but it says less than you think." In terms of general fidelity to the notion of a written, authoritative, constitution, this last-mentioned approach has significant advantages. Fortunately, it is also
justified by the text.
75 Another possibility, of course, is to take the references to "speech" and "press" as little
more than quaint anachronisms, and then proceed to use the first amendment as the vehicle for
protecting an enormous range of individual, non-communicative conduct. See Baker, supra note
35, at 964. Less explicit hints at the same perspective are in L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 938-90.
Tribe refers to the first amendment throughout his discussion of various forms of expression of
"personhood," but he is rarely explicit about which constitutional provision protects which activity.
Apart from the difficulties I have with treating the constitutional text so casually, there is still
the more important problem ofjustifying an exemption for speech in those circumstances in which
it causes a clear harm. Suppose we change the facts of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), slightly. That is, suppose that the authors of the advertisement, negligently and erroneously but in good faith, charged in the advertisement that Sullivan had served two years in jail for
embezzlement. Suppose as well that as a result of this Sullivan loses the next election, cannot get
another job, and winds up on the steps of the Salvation Army as a derelict. Clearly there are some
intervening causes here, but it is also plain that the negligent and erroneous but not intentional
falsity has served as a "but for'' cause of Sullivan's downfall. In these circumstances the New
York Times and the authors of the advertisement would still prevail under the rule of New York
Times. But would we be comfortable if someone's non-communicative and non-political but selfexpressive embodiment of their personhood negligently caused an equivalent harm? I think not,
and I think we would have no problem in wanting to impose liability. I wculd imagine, for
example, that many motorcyclists not only feel that they can better express their personhood without a helmet than with one, but also that they can better express their personhood at eighty miles
an hour than at fifty-five. Are they responsible for the harms they negligently cause when riding
at eighty? I hope so. Are newspapers responsible for negligently causing harms of the same magnitude? No. See Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
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that we must reject self-development justifications for freedom of
speech because they do not set speech apart from the entire range of
intentional actions. Under this alternative response, presented at one
time or another by several of the participants in this Symposium,76
there might be reasons why speech relating to or causing self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization might be more important than
other forms of conduct relating to or causing self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization.77 Alternatively, there might be greater danger in regulating the communicative aspects of, say, self-expression
than in regulating the non-communicative aspects of self-expression. 78
I have no desire whatsoever to refute any of these arguments, because these arguments, unlike the argument from coincidence, acknowledge the very point at issue. Indeed, they do more than
acknowledge it, they concede it; for the qualifications about speech being a more important form of self-expression, or about the regulation of
speech-related self-expression being particularly dangerous, are concessions of the very point under dispute. If there is some reason to treat
self-expressive speech differently from other forms of self-expressive
activities (and the same would apply to activities that foster self-fulfillment or self-realization), then that reason becomes part of the underlying theoretical justification for the first amendment. In other words, a
reason has just been given for treating speech specially.
When we combine a general justification, such as self-expression,
with a specifically articulated qualification, as in the arguments now
being discussed, the underlying justification for the principle of freedom of speech might be complex rather than simple. This, of course, is
not in itself a problem. Indeed, general justifications are likely to become so general that they are of little if any assistance in helping us to
decide actual cases.79 Nevertheless, if we are to use this more complex
underlying theory to help us reach a decision in a hard case, we must
use the entire justification and not only part of it. That is, we would
have to look not only for the presence or absence of self-development
factors, but also for the presence or absence of those factors that lead us
to treat speech as a particularly important and special subset of selfdevelopment in general.
For my own part, I happen to believe that if we look closely at
these distinguishing factors, we will find sufficient dangers in govern76 Greenawalt, supra note 72, at 734 n.344; Perry, Freedom ofExpression: An Essay on Theory
and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1137, 1154 (1983); Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 1238-39. Perry's
"epistemic value" seems responsive to some of the concerns I am expressing, but I question
whether the response is successful. In other words, is the epistemic value sufficiently different
from or narrower than the various self-realization values so that it does not present the same
problems I am raising here?
77 Greenawalt, supra note 72, at 734 n.344.

78 /d.
79
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ment regulation of a wide range of communication-dangers different
in kind and degree from government regulation of other activities-to
justify a principle of freedom of speech without having to resort to notions of self-expression, self-fulfillm.ent, or self-realization. To me the
dangers of excess governmental regulation are a self-sufficient justification.80 I may be wrong in this. The point, however, is that if some such
reason is either self-sufficient or supplementary, it is still a reason for
treating speech specially.

VII
Although the foregoing discussion has taken place in the context
of self-development values that are argued to provide the foundations
for the principle of free speech, the self-development justification is offered merely as an example of the larger question of the extent to which
speech is or must be special. When I claim that a principle of free
speech is "independent,"81 therefore, I am not claiming that the principle is or can be entirely self-standing. Nor do I claim that free speech is
an end in itself,82 or an ultimate, irreducible value, although I do believe that ultimate irreducible values exist. 83 Thus, free speech, perhaps
because it is so counter-intuitive84 in protecting a wide panoply of
80 F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 80-86.
81 Id at 3-7. See Perry, supra note 76, at 1154 n.72.
82 See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,

72 YALE L.J. 877, 880
(1963). There is an unfortunate tendency to say that everything that is valued for non-utilitarian
or anti-utilitarian reasons is a "good in itself." Yet such a statement confuses utilitarianism with
any talk of causes and conditions. That is, there may be certain primary personal goods, perhaps
such as autonomy and liberty. It may also be that a certain deontological, anti-utilitarian theory
holds that individual liberty and autonomy should be protected even at the expense of the general
public welfare. It also may be that certain conditions, such as freedom of speech, are conducive to
autonomy and liberty. In these circumstances it would be erroneous to say that free speech is a
"good in itself," because it is good for what it does, or what it leads to, and not what it is. It is
possible that free speech may under some theories be a component of a primary good such as
liberty or autonomy, and in this case we would be more warranted in saying that it was a good in
itself. Nevertheless, the point is that speech or free speech can be merely instrumental with respect
to certain individual primary goods, and still be a component of an anti-utilitarian theory.
83 See I. BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL EsSAYS (1978); Williams, Ethical Consistency, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 166 (1973). Thus, I have considerable sympathy for
what Rawls refers to as "intuitionism." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34 (1971). See Feinberg, Rawls and Intuitionism, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OF
JusTICE 108 (N. Daniels ed. 1975).
84 See Emerson, supra note 82, at 887-900. Because Emerson's distinction between expression
and action has not stood the tests of either time or close scrutiny, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 30,
at 579, 598-601; Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Yacavone, Emerson's Distinction, 6
CoNN. L. REv. 49 (1973), there is an unfortunate tendency to discount the remainder of his contributions to free speech theory. But we should not allow the sneers of the contemporary cognoscente to distract us from recognizing Emerson's profoundly important insights regarding the
counter-intuitive nature of the principles of free speech, and the importance of designing not only
principles, but institutions, to accomodate and compensate for this factor. Unless we recognize, as
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harmful and obnoxious activities, must especially be justified by reference to some other, presumably more fundamental, principle or
principles.
When we engage in the process of searching for these more fundamental principles, we must, as I have argued, 85 be willing to accept all
of the conclusions that follow from acceptance of the more fundamental principle, or provide some distinction between speech and the other
activities generated by the principle. If we justify free speech by reference to a principle of democracy, 86 or some broader principle or
scheme of politicalliberty, 87 for example, then we must be willing to
accept not only a principle of free speech, but also those other more
specific principles that follow from a general principle of democracy or
political liberty. In fact we do precisely that, because we protect voting
and other activities related to the process of government as strongly as
we protect freedom of speech, 88 albeit in different ways and with different doctrines. An argument based on democracy, therefore, even without any further qualifications, satisfies the constraint of articulate
consistency in a way that an argument from self-expression simpliciter
does not.
Thus, we cannot distinguish free speech, or speech itself, from all
other activities. That is undoubtedly impossible. 89 It nevertheless remains crucial that we treat freedom of speech as being independent
from general liberty, because of two interrelated problems. First, we
want to protect speech more than we protect many other activities that
are part of some conception of general liberty. For example, we want
to protect speech more than we protect economic activity, although
under some theories economic activity is an important and perhaps
even central part of liberty in general. 90 We also want to protect free
speech more than we want to protect a wide range of non-communicaEmerson has forced us to do, that freedom of speech is a fragile value, and one whose protection is
likely to focus on the crackpots and ideological dregs who are the most common litigants in first
amendment cases, we will make little progress in designing doctrines and institutions sufficient to
the task.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
86 E.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 33; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning o/ the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191. See also Brennan, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation o/ the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1965).
87 See Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in 3 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 1 (S. McMurrin ed. 1982).
88 In some instances we do so by explicit textual commitment. E.g., U.S. CONST. amends.
XV, XVII, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. In other instances we use interpretation of broader constitutional
provisions. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). At times we construct entire theories.
E.g., J. ELY, supra note 47.
89 See Perry, supra note 76, at 1185.
90 E.g., F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974).
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tive lifestyle choices, although once again these choices are to some an
important component of liberty in general.9 1 The second point, inseparable from the first, is that we are unwilling to disable ourselves from
dealing with harmful, offensive, obnoxious, dangerous behavior in general in the way that we are with reference to speech.
Thus there exists in current free speech doctrine a difference in
both the type and probability of harms that will justify government
intervention. Harms that are sufficient outside the coverage of the first
amendment are non-cognizable within the coverage of the first amendment; and even with respect to harms that are entitled to consideration
both inside and outside the first amendment, the first amendment requires a likelihood of harm much higher than we otherwise require. 92
It is this difference that is in need of theoretical justification, at least as
we continue to contemplate broadening the first amendment, and thus
it is important to see why speech might be special with respect to general liberty. Fortunately, this is an easier task than trying to see if
speech is special simpliciter, but that does not mean that we have already achieved success.
VIII
In searching for an underlying theoretical justification for the principle of freedom of speech, it is possible that we will find a number of
different justifications. Although some theories are indeed unitary, 93
and although there need not be anything inherently wrong with a unitary theory, so, too, there need not be anything wrong with a multivalued theory.
When I refer to a multi-valued theory of the first amendment, I am
actually including two different types of multi-valued theories. One
type views the language of the free speech and free press clauses of the
first amendment as the umbrella under which are located a number of
more or less distinct separate principles, each with its own justification,
and each directed towards a separate group of problems. Under such a
view, for which I acknowledge considerable sympathy,94 we might in
fact have several first amendments. We might have one first amendment directed primarily to the problem of government suppression of
its critics. The justifications for this first amendment might be largely
of the democratic theory95 and abuse of governmental power96 vari~
91 See Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978).
92 Compare the standard of likelihood in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)(per

curiam), with the ''unprovable assumption" theme in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973).
93 E.g., Perry, supra note 76; Redish, Free Speech, supra note 29.
94 See Schauer, supra note 11, at 313.
95 See supra note 33.
96 See supra note 34.
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eties, and this first amendment might be the one that is most applicable
to cases such as New York Times Co. v. Sul!ivan,9 7 NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 98 and United States v. Grace, 99 just to take one famous
and two recent examples. Another first amendment might be directed
primarily towards the problem of open inquiry in the sciences and at
academic institutions, being based primarily on the heritage of Galileo
and the search for truth/marketplace of ideas justifications for the principle of free speech. 100 Perhaps this is the first amendment, albeit with
some overlap with the one mentioned previously, that lurks around
cases such as Sweezy v. New Hampshire 101 and Board of Education~ Island Trees Free Union School .District v. Pico . 102 A third first amendment might be a reaction to an excess of historical censorship of the
arts, 103 leading to cases such as Southeastern Promotions~ Ltd v. Conrad104 and Jenkins v. Georgia, 105 and perhaps even based in part on
notions of self-realization. This list of possible first amendments is of
course representative rather than exhaustive, but I think I have made
the point.
Alternatively, the other variety of multi-valued theory might say
that speech represents a unique mix of various different characteristics,
not duplicated in other human endeavors. 106 This unique mix of selfexpression, self-realization, capacity for influencing political change,
and so on, is then said to justify special protection for speech. This is
by no means an implausible view, but it seems somewhat sticky in application, at least at the margin. That is, what do we do when we are
unsure of first amendment coverage in a close case? I suspect that here
it would be futile to inquire into whether this instance presents the
same kind of unique mix of characteristics that justifies the special pro376 u.s. 254 (1964).
458 u.s. 886 (1982).
103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983).
100 See supra note 32.
101 354 U.S. 234 (1957). I pick Sweezy because it concerns speech in the classroom, albeit indirectly, but still in contrast with all of the supposed "academic freedom" cases that in fact involve
merely the free speech rights of public employees, on their own time, some of whom coincidentally happen to be teachers. See Schauer, Private Speech, supra note 2, at 242-49. These issues
were raised but ultimately not decided in Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (per
curiam) (dismissing appeal for mootness, lack of standing, and absence of article III jurisdiction).
102 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
103 I use "historical" not in the sense of a problem that was perceived as significant by the
framers, or even at that time, but rather in the sense of a problem that the Court has perceived as
having been a problem in the past. Thus, the rigidity of current standards for obscenity, Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Pinkus v. United States,
436 U.S. 293 (1978), is likely a reaction to the extremes of the nineteenth and first half of the
twentieth centuries, and not to problems identified as such, or even existing, in the eighteenth
century.
104 420 u.s. 546 (1975).
105 418 u.s. 153 (1974).
106 E.g., Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 1238-39.
97
98
99
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78:1284 (1983)

tection of speech. 107 Rather, we would look at the particular components of that mix that were present in the case at hand, and when that
happens this second type of multi-valued theory collapses into the first.
IX
Earlier I drew the distinction between abstract political theory and
constitutional interpretation. 108 Although it is a hotly contested point of
constitutional theory, 109 at least all of the participants in this Symposium subscribe to the view that the development of constitutional principles need not be based solely on the dictionary definition of the words
in the text, 110 nor on the specific understandings of those who drafted
the provisions at issue. Thus, the task of the courts, in attempting to
interpret the open-ended and morally loaded constitutional provisions-freedom of speech, equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, and so on-is to develop a theory of these clauses, a theory that
will be significantly philosophical but will include a large dose of
precedent. 111
When we are engaged in theory construction in this sense, we can
proceed in alternative ways. One approach is to attempt to work out an
ideal political theory independent of the particular constitutional provision at issue, such as freedom of speech, and then proceed to apply that
clause to the extent that it supports that theory. I have little sympathy
for this approach, in large part because its chief analytical tool seems to
be the shoehorn. To the extent that the text does not fit the preconceived theory, then a little pushing and pulling, huffing and puffing,
bending and slicing, and-voila-one's preconstructed political theory
just happens to be embodied in the Constitution, with nothing left
out.II2
An alternative approach, and one much more consistent with my
vision of constitutionalism, is one that starts with the particular clause
as the mandate for building a narrow theory of that clause. We start
with freedom of speech, for example, because freedom of speech is
107 It is possible, of course, that we might create a rule based on a certain general mix of
characteristics, and then, like most rules, apply it more or less mechanically without determining
whether this particular instance does or does not fit the underlying theory of the rule. That perception, however, does not apply to this inquiry, in which, by stipulation, we are dealing with
those close instances that require that we go beneath the surface of the rule.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
109 See Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic 17zeory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981); Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Judicial Review and the Constitution 17ze
Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 443 (1983).
110 I use "dictionary definition" to make the statement non-trivial. Everyone purports to be
defining the terms in the Constitution. The dispute is about where the definition comes from.
See Schauer, supra note 28.
Ill See Schauer, supra note 46. See also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
112 For more extensive criticism of this approach, see Monaghan, supra note 47.
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written down in the authoritative document, and then proceed to work
out a theory of freedom of speech. Under this approach we accept the
presupposition that speech is special, because the text imposes that presupposition on us. Then we try as hard as we can to derive an underlying theory that is consistent with the textual presupposition. It is this
process that I have implicitly described throughout this Article. We are
required to accept the view that the Constitution gives speech and press
special protection, that in close cases we must develop an underlying
theory of the first amendment, and that this underlying theory must be
consistent with, and preferably supportive of, the special protection for
speech given by the document. It is in this sense that I maintain that
speech must be special.
X

There is an intellectual ache in all of this, and it may be shared by
many people now engaged in the process of trying to explore the theoretical foundations of the principle of freedom of speech. As we reject
many of the classical platitudes about freedom of speech and engage in
somewhat more rigorous analysis, trying to discover why speech-potentially harmful and dangerous, often offensive, and the instrument of
evil as often as of good-should be treated as it is, our intuitions about
the value of free speech, solid as they may be, are difficult to reconcile
with this analysis. The ache, it seems to me, is caused by the fact that
although the answer to "Must speech be special?" is probably "Yes,"
the answer to "Is speech special?" is probably "No." Reconciling this
inconsistency is the agenda we cannot avoid.
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